The reference to 'states' is made for the sake of simplicity, as also other international legal entities (notably, international governmental organisations) can contribute to the setting up of international judicial systems and may have a role in developing subsequent practice similar to the one of states -as set forth also by Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations, 21 March 1986 (not yet in force). Their role is, in this respect, radically different from the one of individuals, investors or NGOs, who may be subject to the jurisdiction of specifi c international tribunals but play no role in their establishment. However, specifi cally with reference to Article 31(3)(b) the peculiar position of international organizations' practice is usually discussed in different terms, which rather concern the effects of their own practice for the purposes of interpretation of their constituent instrument (see para I). specify its scope and sometimes note its general trend'.
3 At the same time, the task of contributing to the elucidation and development of international law is more or less explicitly entrusted to at least some international courts: it is prominent for the ICJ but concerns also other permanent courts and institutional arbitration. 4 However, the boundaries between evolutive interpretation of treaties and modifi cation of the obligations enshrined therein are at times diffi cult to draw; it is thus not easy to understand how the role of international courts and tribunals interpreting of international treaties fi ts into the framework of the rules on interpretation set forth by the VCLT. Some authors consider that, while the parties to a treaty share the competence to interpret it, the interpretation by an international tribunal may amount to an 'authentic interpretation' of the treaty; 5 other scholars point to the existence, in this regard, of a 'shared interpretive competence' of the parties and international courts, 6 and pronouncements of international tribunals are at times treated as 'subsequent practice' on the same basis as states' behaviours for the purposes of interpretation, 7 whereas this contention is expressly rejected in 
